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Introduction 
Since 'in teaching philosophy the first beginning is from definition' (De Corpore 
1.6.15; EW i, 85), we should begin with Hobbes's definitions of 'good' and 'evil' 
in Leviathan: 'whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it for 
which he for his part called good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil' (L 
vi.7; 28). According to these definitions, good and evil exist only in relation to 
individuals, not absolutely, as Hobbes straightaway acknowledges: 'these words of 
good and evil ... are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there 
being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil 
to be taken from the objects themselves' (Ibid.: 28-9). Furthermore, they are the 
objects of emotion or passion, rather than thought or understanding. Or, as Hob- 
bes even more bluntly says, 'Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and 
aversions', at least in the state of nature (L xv.40; 100). Evil, for example, is what 
a man hates, where hate is just the feeling of aversion to something, whether the 
thing is present or merely thought (L vi.3; 28). For Hobbes, passions like appetite 
and aversion are simply motions within the body, especially with the heart, that 
are directed 'to or from the object' that acts on the sense organs (L vi.9; 28). So 
good and evil are names for the reactions men feel in their hearts, of wanting 
to obtain or avoid something on the occasion of its presence or thought. Begin- 
ning from these starkly egoistic, emotivist and materialist assumptions, Hobbes 
develops a surprisingly rich account of the nature, sources and varieties of human 
evil (and good). This chapter explores this account, giving special attention to 
Hobbes's egoistic moral psychology, his famous conception of the origin and func- 
tion of the commonwealth, and his caustic attack on the unholy alliance between 
scholastic philosophy and the Roman Church, a.k.a. the 'Kingdom of Darkness'. 
Moral psychology: motion and power 
Hobbes was what we call a 'rational egoist': he believed that the faculty of reason 
is properly directed to the advantage of the agent, i.e. to preservation of his life 
and the satisfaction of his desires. In our natural condition, before or without a 
commonwealth and sovereign, this amounts to a 'right of nature': the liberty that 
'each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of 
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his own nature, that is to say, of how own life, and consequently of doing any- 
thing, which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest 
means thereunto' (L xivl ; 79). This right does not ensure that every one will 
correctly calculate, perceive and pursue what is good for them (and avoid what 
is evil): 'Good (like evil) is divided into real and apparent' (De Homine xi.5; 
48). At the individual level, a person may wrongly prefer the 'short vehemence 
of any carnal pleasure' over their long-term education, reducing their tastes and 
hopes to those oflower animals (L vi.35; 31). At the political level, a person may 
choose to remain in a state of war because they wrongly perceive their liberty 
to be a greater good than their security, or they may promote rebellion and civil 
war because they wrongly perceive subjection to the sovereign as evil (L xv. 4-8; 
90-3 ). What typically happens in such cases is that the person's reason is tainted 
by their passions to such extent they desire what is in fact evil for them. For 
instance, it is reasonable to pardon transgressors, or punish them only for the sake 
of future good, since these policies conduce to our long-term security and peace; 
unfortunately, men act out of vengeance against wrong-doers 'in vain-glory and 
contrary to reason' (L xv. 8-19; 96). Although 'good is said to be relative to per- 
son, place and time' (De Homine xi.4 ), just as different diets are suitable to differ- 
ent constitutions and circumstances, drinking poison and instigating war are evil 
even for someone who desires these things and calls them 'good'. 
Self-preservation is the primary objective good (and self-destruction the pri- 
mary evil) independently of 'person, place and time'. Indeed, Hobbes maintains 
that the 'laws of nature' consist precisely in those rules or precepts 'found out by 
reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his own life' 
(L xiv.3; 79). In early works, self-preservation is characterized not so much as an 
obligation as a necessity of our species. In De Cive, for example, he writes that 
every man 'is desirous of what is good for him and shuns what is evil, but chiefly 
the chiefest of all natural evils which is Death; and this he doth by a certain 
impulsion of nature no less than that whereby a stone moves downward' (De Cive 
i. 7; 115). This is why a person cannot voluntarily give up his right to defend him- 
self against those who attempt to murder him: 'because he cannot be understood 
to aim thereby at any good to himself' (L xiv.8; 82). Nor is a subject ever obliged 
to kill himself even if it is commanded by a rightful sovereign (L xxi.15; 142). 
As for voluntary suicide, Hobbes observes that since the 'natural and necessary' 
intention of every man is towards his self preservation: 'if he kills himself it is to 
be presumed that he is not compos mentis' (EW vi; 88). 
As these passages illustrate, the universal goodness of self-preservation, which 
is asserted repeatedly in Leviathan and later works, is usually paired with the 
corresponding evil of death. It is somewhat surprising that Hobbes would harp 
so much on this evil since, unlike most seventeenth-century philosophers, he 
shared the materialism and mortalism of Epicurus and Lucretius, who famously 
evangelized against the fear of death. 
Necessity of nature maketh man to will and desire bonum sibi, that which is 
good for themselves, and avoid that which is hurtful, but most of all that terrible 
enemy of nature, death from which we expect both the loss of all power and also 
the greatest of all bodily pain in losing it (EL l.xiv.6; 54). 
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Even if the Epicureans are right that the state of being dead is not bad or pain- 
ful in itself - Hobbes himself notes that after death there is no experience of the 
tributes paid by the survivors (L xi.6; 59) - death is nevertheless malum sibi in 
two respects. First, it deprives us of all power. The power of a man Hobbes defines 
as 'his present means to obtain some future apparent good' (L x.l; 50). A man is 
worthy of honor in proportion to his power. That is why, for example, 'riches are 
honorable; for they are power; poverty dishonorable' (L x.40; 53 ). But natural 
powers, like prudence and strength, and acquired powers, like friends and riches, 
are not valued primarily as instruments to distinct goods but as means to greater 
and greater power: 'the nature of power is in this point like to fame, increasing as 
it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies which the further they go make 
still the more haste' (L x.2; 50). Death renders us powerless and so robs us of what 
we most desire for ourselves and most esteem in others: 'I put for a general incli- 
nation of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death' (L xi.2; 58). Second, death is the most painful of experi- 
ences. What entitles Hobbes to assume all deaths are maximally painful? In the 
Elements of Law he explains that pain consists in the diminution of vital motion 
in the heart (and pleasure in its augmentation) (EL I.vii.l-2; 21-2). Since death 
brings all vital motion to a permanent end, it is the most painful event a living 
being will undergo. And since we feel aversion to what is unpleasant, death is for 
all of us the summum malum. 
So death is not evil because life per se is good, nor because life enables us to 
achieve some inherently valuable end like peace-of-mind or wisdom, but because 
life is a precondition for continuous motion and the pursuit of power. We can 
hope for 'felicity' in this life, i.e. 'a continual success in obtaining those things 
which a man from time to time desireth' (L vi.58; C 34 ). But this felicity is never 
an end to arrive at, a static state, but rather a perpetual, kinetic striving: 'Felic- 
ity is a continual progress of desire, from one object to another, the attaining of 
the former being still but a way to the latter' (L xi.I: 57). This explains Hobbes's 
dismissive attitude to the philosophical conception of the summum bonum as a 
repose of the mind: 'there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of the mind 
while we live here because life itself is motion and can never be without desire 
n~r without fear' (Lvi.58; 34-5. See also L xi.I: 57). 
As motion and power are goods for humans, stasis and weakness are evils. This 
comes out clearly in Hobbes's account of the passion 'dejection of mind', which 
is 'grief from perception of want of power' (L vi.40; 32). In extreme cases, 'dejec- 
tion subjects a man to causeless fears, which is madness commonly called MEL- 
ANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners as in haunting of solitudes and of 
graves' (L viii.20; 41). The thoroughly dejected person, utterly lacking in power 
and the honor it brings, feels most at home wandering among the dead. This is 
Hobbes's paradigm of a miserable and evil human existence. 
Hobbes's thoroughly kinetic and dynamic image of the human good - and 
correspondingly static and impotent conception of human evil - meshes nicely 
with Hobbes's physiology and physics, as one would expect from a thoroughgoing 
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materialist. Sensations are motions produced in the sense organs by the mechani- 
cal action of external bodies. The motions from sensation that linger and fade in 
the brain are imaginations and memories (L ii.3-4; 8-9). These sometimes trigger 
invisible 'beginnings of motion' within the agent that ultimately issue in volun- 
tary motions: 'these small beginnings of motion in the body of man, before they 
appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions, are commonly 
called ENDEAVOR' (L vi.l; 28). When directed towards something external, 
the endeavor is called 'desire' and the object is labeled 'good'; when directed 
away from something the endeavor is called 'hate' and the object is labeled 'bad' 
(L vi.2-7; 28-9). 
Moving to the most fundamental level we find that for Hobbes 'all mutation 
is motion' and likewise causation, power and activity are nothing but motion 
(De Corpore 2.9.9; EW i, 126).1 Furthermore, Hobbes's basic physical principles 
are laws of motion.2 His fundamental 'dynamical' concept, the energy of moving 
bodies transferred in collisions, which he terms endeavor or conatus, is essentially 
kinetic: 'motion made in less space and time than can be given' (De Corpore 
3.15.2; EW i, 206). As Frithiof Brandt remarked many years ago, Hobbes 'should 
more correctly be called a motionalist' than a materialist (1917: 379).3 Motion 
and power are the foundations both of physical change and of human flourishing. 
From war to commonwealth 
Life in a state of war, apart from the commonwealth and its overawing sovereign, 
is clearly bad. The story is a familiar one. By their most universal aspirations - 
self-preservation, occasional delectation, and honor - men come into conflict, 
engendering mutual aggression, fear and enmity. Trade and industry are precluded 
by theft and sabotage; science and the arts require a foolhardy vulnerability to 
treachery; everyone lives continually with violence or its threat. So, 'the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short' (L xiii.9; 76). Since in war any power 
a man possesses is limited, uncertain and temporary, and the motions of his body 
and brain are restricted and animalistic, his felicity is tiny in comparison with his 
misery. 
Although 'it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either 
of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual war is' (De Cive i.13; 118), Hobbes 
ultimately insists that the brutality of war is not morally wrong. This doctrine seems 
to evolve. In De Cive (1642), Hobbes writes that 'all men in the state of nature 
have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither 
equally to be condemned' ( i.4; 114). Killing from vain-glory is worse than killing in 
self-defense, for example. But in Leviathan Hobbes takes a much sterner amoralist 
view: 'the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place' 
(L xiii.13; 78). Morality and justice depend on a voluntary covenant among men 
to transfer their right of nature to preserve themselves as they judge to a sovereign, 
in order to escape the state of war. Without such a covenant, and an authority 
to enforce it, 'private appetite is the measure of good and evil' (L xv.40; 100). 
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But in the established commonwealth, a true science of morality is possible since 
'moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the 
conversation and society of mankind' (Ibid.). 
So in the passage from war to commonwealth, subjective good and evil are 
transformed into objective morality. This morality is mostly comprised under the 
'other laws of nature' - which follow the basic laws, to seek peace and lay down 
the right of nature in order to secure peace - that Hobbes spells out in Chapter 
xv of Leviathan. It is worth briefly examining Hobbes's articulation of two of these 
laws, to appreciate how good and evil can be systematized within a common- 
wealth. The fourth law, Gratitude, states that 'a man which receiveth benefit 
from another of mere grace endeavor that he which giveth it have no reasonable 
cause to repent of his good will' (L xv.16; 95). A gift of mere grace, or 'free-gift', is 
a non-mutual transfer ( unlike a contract). Hobbes notes that all such gifts are out 
of self-interest since 'of all voluntary acts the object is to every man his own good' 
(Ibid.). If this end is frustrated through ingratitude, benevolence and mutual aid 
are undermined and war ensues, contrary to the first law of nature, to seek peace. 
The ninth law, against Pride, states that 'that every man acknowledge all other 
for his equal by nature' (L xvi.21; 97). Hobbes specifically castigates Aristotle for 
arguing otherwise in his infamous 'natural slaves' doctrine, which Hobbes finds 
contrary to both reason and experience. More importantly, from a moral point 
of view, Hobbes claims that whether or not men are by nature equal they 'will 
not enter into conditions of peace but upon equal terms, such equality must be 
admitted' (Ibid.). 
These laws of nature are clearly consistent with Hobbes's egoism: they assume 
that men are motivated by their own good and assert that this good warrants 
gratitude and acknowledgment of equality. Furthermore, unlike the private appe- 
tites that measure good and evil in the state of war, the laws are alleged to be 
objective. It does not depend on this or that man's appetite or background, nor on 
the arbitrary will of the sovereign, whether ingratitude weakens social cohesion 
or whether voluntary covenants require the parties admit one another as natural 
equals. 
These are rather scientific facts about what conduces to peace in the 'conversa- 
tion and society of mankind'. Hobbes puts the point more strongly: 'The laws of 
nature are eternal and immutable, for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance. pride ... 
and the rest can never be made.lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve 
life, and peace destroy it' (L xv. 38; 99-100). Indeed, the term 'law' is somewhat 
misleading, Hobbes concedes, since their truth is not derived from the will of any 
law-giver, but from reason and the 'science of virtue and vice': 'These dictates 
of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly, for they are but 
conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and 
defense of themselves whereas law properly is the word of him that hath by right 
command over others' (L xv.41; 100. See also L xxvi.8; 174). 
But what role does this leave for the sovereign in justice and morality? Hob- 
bes says, after all, that in a commonwealth 'the common rule of good and evil' is 
taken 'not from the objects themselves but from the person that representeth it' 
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(L vi.7; 29). The role of the sovereign, or the judges and arbitrators he appoints, 
is not to make the rules of good and evil, but to apply and (especially) to enforce 
them. That is to say, the sovereign converts the laws of nature, which in them- 
selves are not strictly laws but rather theorems of reason, into binding civil laws. 
'When a commonwealth is once settled then they are actually laws, and not 
before, as being then the commands of the commonwealth, and therefore also 
civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obey them' (L xxvi.8; 
174. See also EL i.xvii.12; 72). And the sovereign obliges by virtue of the rights 
and powers we've given him. So while we are immediately obliged to follow the 
laws of nature because of the covenant we freely made to pursue peace and trans- 
fer our rights of nature to the sovereign, these covenants are valid only if they are 
coercively enforced under the threat of punishment. This is one of the sovereign's 
jobs. Hobbes emphasizes this especially with respect to the third law of nature, 
justice: 'the nature of justice consists in keeping of valid covenants but the valid- 
ity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient 
to compel men to keep them' (L xv.3; 89). So morality is objective in itself, but 
becomes binding when enforced by an overawing sovereign. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that this theory of morality is merely an exten- 
sion of, rather than super-addition to, Hobbes's minimalist account of good and 
evil. In the state of nature, good and evil are what we individually perceive, 
through our desires and aversions, as preserving or threatening us. In the com- 
monwealth, good and evil are what general laws, grounded on reason but enforced 
by the sword, more reliably promote and prohibit by securing social peace and 
security. Morality - the conditions of virtue and vice - is the natural law brought 
under civil authority: 'the ways or means of peace (which I have shewed before 
are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy and the rest of the laws of nature) 
are good ( that is to say moral virtues) and their contrary vices, evil' (L xv.40; 
100). And a person is good or evil in proportion to their tendency to uphold 
these laws: 'fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason; and the breaking of them 
evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfill them good; and 
the neglect of them evil' (EL i.17.14; 72-3; EW iv, 110). 
Since power and motion are fundamental goods for humans, and weakness and 
stillness (ultimately death) are fundamental evils, it follows that liberty or free- 
dom is good. For Hobbes defines liberty as the absence of 'external impediments 
of motion' (L xxxi.l; 136). Combined with the absence of internal impediments 
to motion (such as sickness) we have the conditions for a 'free man': 'he that in 
those things by his strength and wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he 
has a will to do' (Ibid.). Hobbes concedes that men have 'absolute freedom' only in 
the state of war and in this sense the commonwealth is a (necessary) evil. But this 
conclusion should be tempered by several considerations. First, even in the com- 
monwealth one acts freely, even if from fear of punishment, 'as a man throweth 
his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink' (L xxi.3; 136). Second, many 
liberties are specifically retained under a commonwealth since the fundamental 
good of self-preservation requires them, such as self-defense and freedom from 
unnecessary conscription. Freedoms about which the law is typically silent, such 
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as association for pleasure, are also preserved. Third, Hobbes points out that many 
important freedoms are only possible with a commonwealth in place - such as 
'liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise contract with one another, to choose their 
own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life', etc. (L xxxi.6; 138) - while 
the freedoms reserved for war, to do and say and write whatever one wishes, are 
short-lived. The Hobbesian state is neither absolutely free nor absolutely tyran- 
nical, but a mix aimed at maximizing the goods of life: power and motion. And 
as Hobbes says, 'when in the whole chain the greater part is good the whole is 
called good' (EL i.7.1; 23). 
The kingdom of God and the kingdom of darkness 
Questions about evil arise in a number of ways in Hobbes's philosophy of religion. 
While the question whether Hobbes himself was sincerely religious has been 
hotly disputed since his own day (with Hobbes testifying in his own defense), it 
is clear that he took great interest in religion and considered it a force for good if 
properly administered. Religion focuses and quells our fears of the unknown and 
answers to our natural curiosity about the ultimate causes of things (L xi.1-11; 
63-7). Furthermore, religion provides ultimate normative force to the laws of 
nature discussed above, since those laws are conceived both as 'dictates of reason' 
and 'as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things' (L 
xv.4; 100; See also L xxxi.17; 237). So civil law coincides, at least in part, with 
divine law. It is controversial whether Hobbes himself regarded the laws of nature 
as ultimately dependent on God's commands, or merely on reason supported by 
civil force, but it is clear that God commands the laws and that he applies them 
equally to subject and sovereign (L xxvi.7; 138). 
To one of the most obvious and pressing questions about evil and religion, 
namely why evil exists at all in a world fully ordained and controlled by a benevo- 
lent God, Hobbes's answer is not surprising. In Leviathan he says that God justifies 
the afflictions of Job by 'arguments drawn from his power' (L xxxi.6; 236). In 
other words, there is no question of 'justifying' God's actions since they depend 
op his incomprehensible power not our reason. Even so, Hobbes does express con- 
fidence in an early commentary that God's promises 'will be fulfilled in a future 
world where every one will gain his deserts' (De Motu xxxviii.3; 462). It may be 
wondered how anyone deserves credit or blame for their actions, given Hobbes's 
view that everything that happens, including our own wills, follows necessarily 
from God's will. As he puts this necessitarian doctrine in the exchange with 
Bramhall, 'all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause, God 
Almighty, who works in us both to will and to do' (EW v, 450). But, as discussed 
above, Hobbes finds freedom and responsibility to be perfectly compatible with 
such necessity. So, in response to Bramhall's suggestion that if the will is neces- 
sitated 'it will no longer be evil', Hobbes answers that 'the nature of sin consists 
in this, that the action done proceed from our will and be against the law' (EW v, 
229).4 Indeed, he attempts to tum the tables against Bramhall's more libertarian 
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conception of freedom: 'His Lordship, by exempting the will of man from being 
subject to the necessity of God's will or decree, denies by consequence the divine 
prescience, which will also amount to atheism by consequence' (EW iv, 384 ). 
According to Hobbes's genealogy of religion, God is originally conceived as a 
king who rules and ordains either directly or by covenant with a mortal represent- 
ative such Abraham or Moses. Immortal God (a civil sovereign is at best a 'mortal 
god') commands absolute authority of judgment and punishment as the invisible 
sovereign of all creation. So the putative representatives of God, such as priests 
and churches, have considerable power either to reinforce or to undermine peace 
and unity within the commonwealth, as Hobbes knew well from first-hand expe- 
rience of the English civil wars. Hobbes therefore distinguishes between proper 
'religion' - 'fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales 
publicly allowed' - and 'superstition' - the same 'not allowed' (L vi.36; 31). As 
these definitions make clear, religious doctrine (including God's attributes), the 
meaning of the Bible and its canonical texts, and the correct modes of worship, 
are all determined and authorized by the civil sovereign (albeit with the 'counsel' 
of duly appointed church officials). As the effective head of the church, Hobbes 
compares the authority of the sovereign within the 'Christian Commonwealth' 
he envisions to Moses: 'whosoever in a Christian Commonwealth upholdeth the 
place of Moses is the sole messenger of God, and interpreter of his command- 
ments. And according hereunto no man ought in the interpretation of the Scrip- 
ture to proceed further than the bounds which are set by their several sovereigns' 
(L xl.40; 321). Conversely, since the civil laws of the commonwealth are simply 
the laws of nature commanded by God (and dictated by reason), 'the distinction 
between temporal and spiritual domination hath there no place' (L xii. 22; C 71). 
Religion, or rather superstition and false doctrine, unregulated by the sover- 
eign is a major source of evil for Hobbes. Very early in Leviathan, he emphasizes 
that the difficulty we have of distinguishing imagination from sensation, and 
dreaming from waking, fosters superstitious belief in ghosts and witches, which 
'are either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the uses of exorcism, of 
crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men' (L ii.8; 11). This 
implicit attack on Catholic religious ceremony as superstition becomes much 
more frontal and elaborate in later parts of the Leviathan, particularly Part IV, 
'The Kingdom of Darkness', a caustic broadside against the Catholic Church. We 
will restrict our attention to one significant way in which religion can be a force 
of evil, i.e. against civil peace and unity, and therefore superstitious, i.e. unworthy 
of state sanction: by the promulgation of 'vain philosophy'. 
One way religions can become dangerous is by 'the enjoining of a belief of 
contradictories' (L xii.25; 71). On the one hand, the proffering of absurd or con- 
tradictory doctrines discredits a religion and its ministers and brings suspicion 
upon doctrines and revelations that are not contradictory (L xii.25; 72). On the 
other hand, 'the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of 
the Schoolmen' cause men to 'mistake the ignis fatuus of vain philosophy for the 
light of the Gospel' (L xlvii.14; 480). But most importantly the sovereign himself 
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is either weakened by his sponsorship of obscure religions or forced to repudiate 
it and thereby sacrifice an important source of authority. Thus, he asserts that the 
Roman church was abolished in England 
partly from the bringing of the philosophy of Aristotle into religion by the 
Schoolmen, from whence there arose so many contradictions and absurdities 
as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance and of fraudulent 
intention, and inclined people to revolt from them, either agamst rhe will of 
their own princes, as in France and Holland, or with their will, as in England. 
(L xii 31, C, 73) 
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But in what sense is the power of either god directed to ends that are good? 
For the Stoics, the greatest human good is virtue, which is the same as 'living 
in accordance with nature'.8 Insofar as God produces and directs all bodies he 
cannot fail to live in accordance with nature and insofar as he acts in a regular 
and intelligible manner he makes it possible for us to know and achieve human 
virtue.9 The situation is not so different with Hobbes. As we have noted, 'what- 
soever is the object of any man's appetite or desire that is it for his part which 
he calleth good' (L iv. 7; 24). But 'when we ascribe to God a will, it is not to be 
understood as that of man, for a rational appetite, but as the power by which 
he effecteth everything' {L xxi.26; 240). So God's operation is directed at and 
achieves the 'good' simply because he wills and produces the successive states of 
the world. Since we have reason, which enables us to understand how our own 
good, i.e. power and motion, is facilitated by living in accordance with the laws 
of nature, which are the same as the divine laws, the corporeal God can be said 
to reveal and direct us towards good and away from evil (so long as we are not 
ensnared by vain philosophy). 
A particularly pervasive and damaging religious doctrine is that of incorporeal 
substance, which he maintains. is logically impossible because the terms or names 
employed in the concept are 'contradictory and inconsistent', just as much as 
'incorporeal body' (L iv.21; 20. See also EL i.xi.4; 42; EW iv, 61). Thus, sincere 
and sensible theists 'choose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above 
their understanding, than define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess 
their definition to be unintelligible' (L xii.7; 6). Hobbes traces numerous egre- 
gious religious dogma to this source, such as transubstantiation (L viii.27; 46-7), 
as well as 'dark doctrines' like eternal torment and purgatory, which lend support 
to policies like indulgences that discredit the church while unduly empowering 
its officials and weakening the sovereign (L xliv.16; 420). 
Not even God is exempted from Hobbes's prohibition against incorporeal sub- 
stance. While he usually prefers to assert only that God is 'incomprehensible', 
late in his life Hobbes makes his true view explicit in response to his longtime 
nemesis Bishop Bramhall. Since Hobbes considers 'incorporeal substance' con- 
tradictory, Bramhall asks, what then does he 'leave God himself to be?' (WB iv, 
525). Hobbes replies frankly: 'To his lordship's question here: what I leave God 
to be? I answer: I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal' 
(EW iv, 313. See also L Appendix.iii; 540). One might wonder how such a god 
can serve the normative function Hobbes assigns him: commanding the laws of 
nature or morality, punishing the wicked, etc. Unlike the better-known hetero- 
do~y of Spinoza's deus-sive-natura, Hobbes does not altogether dispense with 
teleology. In Leviathan he observes that 'by the visible things of this world, and 
their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men 
call God' (L xi.25; 62).5 Furthermore, Hobbes explicitly attributes 'intelligence' 
to the operation of his corporeal God: 'Can it then be doubted that God, who is 
infinitely fine spirit, and withal intelligence, can make and change all species and 
kinds of bodies as he pleaseth?' (EW iv, 310). 
Hobbes's God is reminiscent of, and possibly inspired by, the god of the Stoics, 
which is also corporeal and thoroughly interspersed with ordinary bodies. 6 Despite 
this, their God understood and acted for the good of the world and even with a 
mind to the interests of humans. Thus, Diogenes observed that the Stoic God is 
'provident towards the world and all its occupants but not anthropomorphic'.7 
Notes 
1 See also De Corpore 4.24.1-2; EW i 389-90; De Corpore 2.10.6; EW i 131. 
2 (i) all physical interaction is between contiguous moving bodies; (ii) whatever is in 
rest or motion remains in that state unless acted on mechanically by another body. De 
Corpore 2.9.7; EW i 124. 
3 Cf. Watkins 1965: 124. 
4 For selections from the long Bramhall-Hobbes debate about free will, see Hobbes and 
Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity. 
5 On 'teleological' reasoning in Hobbes, see Brown 1962: 341-2. 
6 See for example Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers Bk. 7, 134, LS 268-9, 
275. 
7 Lives of the Philosophers 7, 14 7; LS 3 23. See also Plutarch, On Common Conceptions 
175E; LS 327. 
8 Stobaeus LS 394. 
9 See further Baltzly 2003: 18. 
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13 Descartes on evil 
Zbigniew Janowski 
Looking for a theory of evil in Descartes can be considered to be paradoxical or 
even futile. Descartes' philosophical preoccupation was epistemology or theory 
of knowledge, which he needed to build a New or Modern science to replace 
the Aristotelian science of the Mediaevals. His writings are almost completely 
devoid of moral or ethical considerations, and no consistent account of evil is 
to be found in them. Even the most meticulous interpretative labor is not very 
likely to yield a theory of evil that is as distinct as that one finds in, for example, 
Plato, the Stoics, the Cynics, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Spinoza and Leibniz among 
Descartes' most immediate Cartesian successors. One needs to add, however, that 
Descartes' silence on the subject of evil was partly premeditated and dictated by 
prudence. He wanted to stay clear from any theological controversies that occu- 
pied Catholic Church in his times. 
In the Synopsis to the Meditations (1641), Descartes even took the trouble to 
put in parenthesis, to make it more visible, the following disclaimer as to why he 
does not treat the subject of evil in his work: 
(But it is to be noticed, however, that sin - or error that is committed in 
the pursuit of good and evil - is in no way dealt with there; rather only that 
occurs in the judging of the true and false is dealt there. And there is no 
discussion of matters pertaining to faith or the conduct of life, but simply 
speculative truths that are known by means of the natural light.) 
The theological controversies, or rather the controversy to which Descartes 
refers, concerns the growing conflict over such questions as the nature and scope 
of human freedom, predestination and salvation between the Augustinians and 
the followers of the Spanish theologian Louis Molina (1535-1600) (predomi- 
nantly the Jesuits) who in 1588 published a work entitled Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae 
donis ... The conflict reached its peak in 1653 when on the instigation of the 
Jesuits, Pope Innocent X in the bull Cum occasione condemned the teaching of 
Cornelius Jansenius (1585-1638), the author of monumental work Augustinus 
(published posthumously in 1640, in Amsterdam, and 641, in Paris). With that 
1653 bull, the Church abandoned St. Augustine's teaching on freedom in favor of 
the semi-Pelagian doctrine, according to which man is free to do both good and 
evil without God's grace. 
